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A DAM H. KOBLENZ , E SQ . *

The Whole Nine Yards: Should Student-Athletes
Score an Education and Compensation?

This Article analyzes whether student-athletes are adequately compensated for their
contributions. It also explores whether colleges and universities have any fiduciary
duty to ensure a certain modicum of academic success and career development.
I. INTRODUCTION

National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) Division I athletics have been
an integral part of American culture for decades.1 With the advent of multimedia
technologies, collegiate sports now reach a national audience, thus increasing the
accessibility for fans to follow their favorite teams.2 Due to the widespread
commercialization of large collegiate sporting events such as the Final Four and the
College Football Playoff, collegiate sports have become a major revenue generating
business, both at the university and corporate level.3 Millions of dollars in revenue
are generated “through ticket sales, endorsement deals, broadcasting deals and jersey
sales.”4 Everyone involved, from corporate sponsors to university administrators to
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1.
See Thomas Rosandich, Collegiate Sports Programs: A Comparative Analysis, 122 EDUC. 471, 472–75
(2002); Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2011, https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017).
2.
See, e.g., NCAA March Madness Live VR App to Offer Enhanced Virtual Reality Experience for 2017
NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Championship, NCAA (Mar. 21, 2017, 1:28 PM), http://www.
ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/article/2017-03-20/ncaar-march-madnessr-livetm-vr-app-offer-enhancedvirtual.
3.
See Michael S. McLeran, Comment, Playing for Peanuts: Determining Fair Compensation for NCAA
Student-Athletes, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 260–61 (2017); Johnathan Berr, March Madness: Follow the
Money, CBS NEWS (Mar. 20, 2015, 5:45 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/march-madness-follow-themoney/; Playoffs are a Revenue Bonanza for College Football, NBC NEWS (Jan. 1 2015, 2:42 PM ET),
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/playoffs-are-revenue-bonanza-college-football-n277641.
4.
See generally Krikor Meshefejian, Pay to Play: Should College Athletes be Paid?, Opposing
Viewpoints in Context (2008), http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/ViewpointsDetailsPage/DocumentToolsPortlet
Window?displayGroupName=Viewpoints&jsid=eefbd8901aad2960f1f563899801e024&action=2&catId=&doc
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coaches alike, receives a portion of the “financial pie.” 5 The party responsible for
these economic rewards, the student-athlete, is arguably left out of this equation. 6
Therefore, it is imperative to explore certain conflicts that arise when college athletes
are exploited for their on-field talent, as the academic component suffers at the
student-athlete’s expense.7
The critical issues that will be addressed in this Article are: (1) whether studentathletes should be compensated for their player likeness, on-field performance, right
to publicity and income generated from apparel sales, television, mobile
application(s), live streaming deals, advertisements, and other sources; and (2) what,
if any, fiduciary duty a college or university has to a scholarship athlete to ensure
both the academic success of the student-athlete during matriculation as well as postgraduation career development.
By examining the disparate proportion of income generated by college athletics
in comparison to the compensation received by the student-athlete in the form of
athletic scholarships, this Article demonstrates that student-athletes do not receive
the compensation they deserve for a myriad of reasons. In addition, this Article will
reveal that while colleges may not have a “legal” fiduciary duty to ensure the
academic success of both its current four-year varsity scholarship athletes and former
scholarship players, colleges do have a reasonable duty to provide appropriate
resources and/or support necessary for student-athletes to achieve a certain modicum
of academic success and post-graduation career enhancement.
II. ANALYZING COMPENSATION ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO STUDENTATHLETES

A. Player Likeness
A critical issue in the debate over compensation of student-athletes is whether
student-athletes should be compensated for their player-likeness.8 Universities often
umentId=GALE%7CEJ3010490203&u=sand55832&zid=bfdd9a8a6cf2a5dc620970f20529569f (last visited
Nov. 10, 2017).
5.
See McLeran, supra note 3, at 260–61; Ramogi Huma & Ellen J. Staurowsky, The $6 Billion Heist:
Robbing College Athletes Under the Guise of Amateurism, NAT’L C. PLAYERS ASS’N, 9 (2012), http://assets.
usw.org/ncpa/pdfs/6-Billion-Heist-Study_Full.pdf.
6.
See Huma & Staurowsky, supra note 5, at 9, http://assets.usw.org/ncpa/pdfs/6-Billion-HeistStudy_Full.pdf.
7.
Id. at 8.
8.
See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016) (anti-trust lawsuit filed by current and former college athletes against the NCAA
alleging Sherman Act violations for restraining trade in relation to players’ names, images, and likenesses); Travis
Waldron, ESPN’s Jay Bilas Exposes NCAA’s Hypocrisy on Amateurism with Simple Web Search,
THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 7, 2013), https://thinkprogress.org/espns-jay-bilas-exposes-ncaa-s-hypocrisy-onamateurism-with-simple-web-search-dba4300df7fd/.
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print media guides for some of their larger or more lucrative programs such as
football and basketball.9 These media guides, along with game schedules, posters,
and radio and television advertisements feature a student-athlete’s likeness in order
to garner interest in the particular athletic program.10 Arguably, student-athletes
waive their right to player-likeness upon their agreement to accept an academic
scholarship.11 The rationale behind this concept is rooted in an underlying contractual
relationship amongst the parties whereby one party, the student-athlete, in effect,
agrees that the university can use his/her image for the benefit of the university in
exchange for the university’s pledge to provide a substantially discounted
opportunity to attend college.12
In the context of player-likeness, proponents of student-athlete compensation
argue that an individual’s likeness provides the vehicle to sell tickets, collegiate
apparel, concessions and obtain lucrative corporate partnerships. 13 Therefore,
proponents contend that student-athletes should be compensated for the usage of
their likeness since their presence is the primary catalyst facilitating this form of
commerce.14
Critics of student-athlete compensation for usage of player-likeness claim that
student-athletes receive compensation in the form of athletic scholarship, and
therefore are sufficiently compensated.15 Critics believe that since the university
provides the means for players to perform on national stages, thus facilitating a
player’s exposure to media attention and professional scouting, adequate

9.
See, e.g., Archive of Ohio State Football Statistics and Media Guides, OHIO STATE BUCKEYES,
http://www.ohiostatebuckeyes.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/statistics.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2017)
(providing links to Ohio State football media guides for the last fifty years).
10.
See Maureen A. Weston, Gamechanger: NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation
and the Future of College Sports, 3 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 77 (2013) (discussing NCAA rule requiring athletes to
allow NCAA to use name and likeness for promotional purposes, and exploring ways to resolve antitrust and
publicity rights issues NCAA is litigating).
11.
See id. at 84–86; John Keilman & Jared S. Hopkins, College Athletes Routinely Sign Away Rights to be
Paid for Names, Images, CHI. TRIB. (March 26, 2015, 8:23 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
sports/college/ct-ncaa-waivers-met-20150326-story.html.
12.
Weston, supra note 10, at 84 – 86.
13.
See Huma & Staurowsky, supra note 5, at 9; Branch, supra note 1, at 18–19.
14.
See Branch, supra note 1, at 4–5; Sean Gregory, Time Cover Story: It’s Time to Pay College Athletes,
TIME (Sept. 16, 2013), http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,2151167,00.html.
15.
See Alex Prewitt, Large Majority Opposes Paying NCAA Athletes, Washington Post-ABC News Poll
Finds, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/large-majority-opposespaying-ncaa-athletes-washington-post-abc-news-poll-finds/2014/03/22/c411a32e-b130-11e3-95e8-39bef8e9a4
8b_story.html?utm_term=.b5a20b279d89.

VOL. 13, NO. 1 2017

39

KOBLENZ_Whole_Nine_Yards (DO NOT DELETE)

1/2/2018 3:29 PM

THE WHOLE NINE YARDS
compensation is therefore provided in exchange for a university’s right to exploit the
student-athlete’s player likeness.16
B. Right to Publicity
In the context of college athletics, the right to publicity is another major topic
surrounding the issue of compensation.17 The right to publicity is derived from the
tort right of privacy and protects an individual from unauthorized commercial
exploitation of their identity. 18 Right to publicity pertains to issues protecting an
individual against defamation or libel. 19 Under the current system, professional
athletes and entertainers are entitled to a right to publicity and are paid accordingly. 20
NCAA collegiate athletes also have a right to publicity, however, their compensation
is solely education-related because they are classified as “amateurs.” 21 In other
words, NCAA collegiate athletes can only be compensated for the full cost of
attendance at their respective college/university.22 NCAA collegiate athletes,
therefore, cannot be “offer[ed] cash sums untethered to educational expenses”

16.
See Brian Sweany, Steve Patterson, UT’s New Athletic Director, on Student-Athletes Profiting from
Their Name and Likeness, TEXAS MONTHLY, Aug. 15, 2014, at 3–4, https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-standup-desk/steve-patterson-uts-new-athletic-director-on-student-athletes-profiting-from-their-name-and-likeness.
17.
See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1268 (9th Cir.
2013) (affirming that video game developer’s use of former college athlete’s likeness in its video games was not
protected by the First Amendment, therefore former athlete’s right-of-publicity claims were not barred by
California’s anti-SLAPP statute); Oliver Herzfeld et al., Athletes in Video Games: Balancing Publicity Rights
and the First Amendment, FORBES, Sept. 22, 2016, at 1–2, https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/
2016/09/22/athletes-in-video-games-balancing-publicity-rights-and-the-first-amendment/#46a87e855b3e.
18.
Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 386–87
(1999).
19.
Id. at 453.
20.
In 2016, it is estimated that athletes Roger Federer, Lebron James, and Phil Mickelson each made over
fifty million dollars in endorsement deals based solely on their name, image, and likeness. See Top 100 HighestPaid Athlete Endorsers of 2016, OPENDORSE (June 29, 2016), http://opendorse.com/blog/2016-highest-paidathlete-endorsers/. As for entertainers, Beyoncé Knowles-Carter inked a fifty-million-dollar endorsement deal
with Pepsi in 2012 for the use of her name, image, and likeness. Allison Aubrey, This is How Much Celebrities
get Paid to Endorse Soda and Unhealthy Food, National Public Radio (June 7, 2016, 5:57 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/06/07/481123646/this-is-how-much-celebrities-get-paid-to-endorsesoda-and-unhealthy-food.
21.
See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1289 (9th Cir.
2013) (noting that the publicity rights of college athletes are remarkably restricted, and a college athlete’s right
of publicity is “extraordinarily circumscribed and, in practical reality, nonexistent.”); O’Bannon v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting the NCAA “amateur” model restricts
compensation to only education based benefits).
22.
Although this may vary from school to school, the full cost of attendance usually includes: (1) tuition
and fees; (2) room and board; (3) books and supplies; and (4) transportation. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at n3.
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because doing so would force the NCAA to “surrender[] its amateurism principles
entirely.”23
Not all legal scholars agree with the notion that, because an NCAA athlete is
classified as an “amateur,” he/she cannot be compensated for exercising his/her right
to publicity.24 In Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, author
Alice Haemmerli utilizes Kantian philosophy to “justify an autonomy-based right of
publicity.”25 Haemmerli argues that the right to publicity can be “an extension of
human worth and autonomy.”26 She suggests that the right of publicity is a “property
claim grounded in Lockean labor theory.”27 Under this framework, Haemmerli
would likely contend that regardless of an individual’s status as an amateur athlete
subject to NCAA regulations, the individual has an inherent right to exploit his/her
right to publicity whether it be for pecuniary gain or simply for privacy reasons. 28
The argument against student-athletes retaining a right to publicity is that a
college-athlete surrenders his/her rights to publicity when he/she accepts the NCAA
regulations and terms governing athletic scholarships. 29 Critics may argue that since
the university retains the rights to the student-athlete’s likeness for university related
promotional brochures or marketing material, the student-athlete does not retain a
right of action against college administrators or corporate sponsors who legally
transmit materials with the student-athlete’s likeness. 30
C. On-Field Performance
NCAA Division I athletes perform on the field at the highest level of amateur
athletics.31 The main issue in the context of compensation of student-athletes is
whether an athlete should reap a portion of the financial benefits that he/she may

23.

Id. at 1078–79.
See, e.g., Huma & Staurowsky, supra note 5, at 14.
25.
Haemmerli, supra note 18, at 383.
26.
Id. at 390.
27.
Id. at 388.
28.
See id. at 428.
29.
See, e.g., Kendall K. Johnson, Comment, Enforceable Fair and Square: The Right of Publicity,
Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Contracts, SPORTS L. J., 1, 6, 13–14 (2012); Darren Heitner, NCAA
Fails Kicker Donald De La Haye And All Student-Athletes, FORBES, Aug. 3, 2017, at 1–4,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2017/08/03/ncaa-fails-kicker-donald-de-la-haye-and-all-studentathletes/#1731d9493776.
30.
See Johnson, supra note 29, at 34.
31.
See generally Gary R. Gray & Scott E. Crowell, Risk Management Behaviors in NCAA Division I
Athletic Programs, 3 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 64, 64 (1993) (“NCAA Division I athletes compete at the highest
level of intercollegiate sports in America.”).
24.
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bestow upon the university.32 There is a quantifiable disparate proportion of income
generated by student-athletes for university benefit in comparison to the
compensation that student-athletes receive in the form of scholarships, financial aid
packages, and the like.33
In NCAA Division I Football, for example, if a college team qualified for a
College Football Playoff Berth, the earning potential for a university could reach in
the millions.34 For example, in 2004 “the Atlantic Coast Conference generated $17.7
million just from the [Bowl Champion Series] alone, not including individual
schools’ tickets sales or team apparel.”35 A single Bowl Champion Series berth could
bring an individual university $13 million in revenue.36 When one considers that the
average athletic scholarship being awarded today is approximately $18,000, one
might argue that this form of compensation pales in comparison to the substantial
financial gain accumulated by the university.37
The “Pay-for-Play” advocates are proponents of compensating student-athletes
for their on-field performance.38 They contend that “student-athletes are exploited by
the universities for which they play in order to create a financial windfall for the
universities.”39 In the past decade, the two most popular and typically greatest funded
college programs are basketball and football, of which the “revenue generated by
these two sports has increased nearly 300% such that they now fund almost all other

32.
See McLeran, supra note 3, at 256 (“As the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has
transformed into an organization that runs a billion-dollar industry, a debate has begun about whether studentathletes should be entitled to greater compensation than a one-year renewable athletic scholarship.”).
33.
Audrey C. Sheetz, Student-Athletes vs. NCAA: Preserving Amateurism in College Sports Amidst the
Fight for Player Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865, 866 (2016) (noting that the college sports industry is
roughly $11 billion dollars and student athletes do not receive any revenue other than scholarships); Leslie E.
Wong, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O’Bannon Takes on the NCAA for Infringing on the Former
Student-Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1069, 1093–94 (2010) (discussing the massive
disparity between the billions of dollars of revenue generated from the use of collegiate athletes images versus
the scholarships given to the players in return).
34.
Revenue Distribution, COLLEGE FOOTBALL PLAYOFF, http://www.collegefootballplayoff.com/revenuedistribution (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
35.
Mike Vivenzio, Should Athletes Receive Compensation?, THE PENDULUM ONLINE (Feb. 24, 2005),
http://www.elon.edu/e-web/pendulum/issues/2005/02_24/sports/compensation.xhtml.
36.
See BCS Media Guide, SPORTSWRITERS.NET, www.sportswriters.net/fwaa/news/2002/bcsguide03.pdf
(last visited Sept. 25, 2017) (detailing the revenue distributions for universities based on the BCS Bowl game).
37.
See Average Athletic Scholarship per Varsity Athlete, SCHOLARSHIPSTATS, http://www.scholarship
stats.com/average-per-athlete.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2017) (detailing the average amount of funding
collegiate athletes receive).
38.
Christopher W. Haden, Foul! The Exploitation of the Student-Athlete: Student-Athletes Deserve
Compensation for Their Play in the College Athletic Arena, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 673, 674 (2001).
39.
Id.
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sports programs.”40 For instance, in 1991, University of Notre Dame signed a “fiveyear television deal worth $38 million to broadcast all Notre Dame Football home
games.”41 Hypothetically, if there are 100 scholarships per football team, each
student-athlete should receive $380,000 of that $38 million for his/her efforts. 42
Therefore, proponents of Pay-for-Play contend that the compensation received in the
form of tuition is grossly disproportionate to the exorbitant profits retained by the
university or college.43
D. Income Generated from Apparel Sales
Colleges and universities reap significant financial benefits from the sale of college
sports team apparel.44 In the context of student-athlete compensation, it is crucial to
examine the licensing and trademark issues that impact the bottom line in college
athletics.45 For example, “the NCAA has approximately 35 licensees for
merchandise, 16 marketing partners, 10 official ball licensees, 200 different domain
names, and 40 U.S. trademarks and service marks.” 46 Moreover, highly debatable
issues arise as to whether student-athletes should be compensated in proportion to
the amount of sales generated as an indirect result of the student-athlete’s athletic
feats and whether or not a player should be entitled to sell his/her licensing rights on
the open market.47
Proponents of student-athlete compensation argue that the only reason the
university is selling particular team apparel is, due in part, to the star college athlete’s
appeal.48 However, critics may argue that the university retains the rights to the logo,

40.
Greg Skidmore, Payment for College Football Players in Nebraska, 41 HARV. J. LEGIS. 319, 319
(2004).
41.
Richard Sandomir, College Football; Notre Dame Scored a $38 Million Touchdown on Its TV Deal,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 1991) http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/25/sports/college-football-notre-dame-scored-a38-million-touchdown-on-its-tv-deal.html.
42.
Id.
43.
Haden, supra note 38, 673–74.
44.
Id. at 673 (noting that NCAA member institutions benefit financially from lucrative contacts for things
such as apparel and concession sales).
45.
See ADAM EPSTEIN, SPORTS LAW 243–44 (Thompson: Delmar Learning ed. 2003).
46.
Id. at 244.
47.
See generally Michael Aiello, Compensating the Student-Athlete, 23 SPORTS L.J. 157, 166–67 (2016)
(evaluating various compensation schemes for student athletes); Aaron Brooks & David Davies, Exploring
Student-Athlete Compensation: Why the NCAA Cannot Afford to Leave Athletes Uncompensated, 34 J.C. & U.L.
747, 756–57 (2008) (exploring various compensation models and legislation including exempt players from
NCAA restrictions and creating an open market competition system for schools to compensate students based on
their value).
48.
Arash Afshar, Collegiate Athletes: The Conflict between NCAA Amateurism and a Student Athlete’s
Right of Publicity, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101, 117 (2014) (finding that “the profitability of collegiate
merchandising is, in large part, attributed to the student-athletes that elevate the NCAA athletic experience”).
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trademarks, and licensing deals associated with the sale of college athletic apparel.49
These critics contend that a student-athlete relinquishes any right to compensation in
the form of licensing deals in exchange for a scholarship. 50
For example, the University of Michigan’s apparel sells “better than any other
public college” in the United States.51 The University of Michigan has licensing deals
for the sale of 600 different products.52 In 1999, the total revenue generated from the
University of Michigan’s licensing deals was worth approximately $100 million,
some of which, the university retains as royalty fees in exchange for the use of its
names, logos, and colors.53 This amounts to approximately “$4.7 million in total
royalties” retained by the university each year.54 Proponents of student-athlete
compensation would argue that the student-athlete is grossly underpaid for his/her
contribution in comparison to the royalties reaped by the college administration each
year.55
E. Exploring Limitations Imposed Upon “Amateur” College Athletes
1. Case Studies of Student-Athletes: Jeremy Bloom & Mike Williams
In exploring the limitations imposed upon “amateur” college athletes, it is imperative
to analyze the situations involving two superstar college athletes, Jeremy Bloom56
and Mike Williams.57 These two cases illustrate two unique situations where the
NCAA had an opportunity to make an exception for these athletes, yet stayed the
rigid course in furthering a bright-line rule distinguishing amateur sports from

49.
Trademark Licensing Policy, BOSTON U., https://www.bu.edu/brand/our-logos/licensing/ (last visited
Sept. 24, 2017).
50.
Wong, supra note 33, at 1088–91.
51.
EPSTEIN, supra note 45, at 244.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
See McLeran, supra note 3, at 260–61 (discussing how NCAA licensing is a $4.6 billion industry and
everyone is profiting but the student-athlete).
56.
Joel Eckert, Student-Athlete Contract Rights in the Aftermath of Bloom v. NCAA, 59 VAND. L. REV.
905, 906–07 (2006).
57.
Michael R. Lombardo, Comment, Losing Collegiate Eligibility: How Mike Williams & Maurice Clarett
Lost their Chance to Perform on College Athletics’ Biggest Stage, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
19, 36–38 (2005).
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professional sports.58 Both of these cases represent the NCAA’s adversarial stance
against student-athlete compensation.59
Jeremy Bloom was both an Olympic skier and a member of the University of
Colorado’s football team.60 Jeremy Bloom was an extremely talented athlete whom,
prior to accepting a four-year athletic scholarship, had established himself as a worldclass skier on an international stage.61 In order to keep his dream of competing in the
2006 Winter Olympic Games alive, Jeremy Bloom required financial support to
continue his training.62 On the football field, Bloom was a highly acclaimed widereceiver with great speed and catching ability.63 In order to support his Olympic
training, Bloom relied on corporate endorsement opportunities prior to attending
college.64 NCAA rules prohibit an amateur athlete from receiving outside
compensation while participating as an active member of a college team.65 Bloom
challenged this rule, arguing that he was not receiving any financial gain in the
capacity as a college football player but rather the compensation he would receive
would be used solely for Olympic training.66 The case made its way to the Colorado
Court of Appeals which upheld the NCAA rules committee’s decision prohibiting
acceptance of a financial benefit by any college athlete. 67
Critics of the court’s ruling contend that Bloom never violated his eligibility status
with the NCAA because his endorsement opportunity was completely separate from
his participation in the college football program.68 While this case was a unique
situation involving a talented two-sport athlete, it demonstrates the bright line rule
that the NCAA has attempted to maintain between what it considers amateur athletics
versus what is deemed professional sports. 69 Essentially, this decision limited
Bloom’s right to earn a living, thus forcing Bloom to choose between his two
passions.70

58.
See id. at 36–38; see generally Laura Freedman, Comment, Pay or Play - The Jeremy Bloom Decision
and NCAA Amateurism Rules, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673 (2003) (reviewing the
NCAA’s bright line rule preventing a potential Olympic skier from competing and receiving prize money and
endorsements if he wanted to keep his “amateur” play football for the University of Colorado).
59.
See Freedman, supra note 58, at 906–07.
60.
Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
61.
Id.
62.
Eckert, supra note 56, at 907.
63.
Id. at 906.
64.
Id.
65.
Bloom, 93 P.3d at 625.
66.
Id. at 622.
67.
Id. at 628.
68.
Freedman, supra note 58, at 710.
69.
Id. at 688.
70.
Id. at 687.
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Proponents of the court’s ruling argue that the precedent that could have been set
had the ruling been in favor of Bloom may have had the potential of creating certain
loopholes which allow for college-athletes to accept financial benefits without being
subjected to NCAA sanctions.71 While some would disagree with the court’s ruling
in this situation given the unique circumstances facing both the NCAA and the legal
system, it is important that the NCAA maintain a bright line rule in order to prevent
future abuse of the system.72
In the second case study, Mike Williams was a highly touted wide receiver for the
University of Southern California Trojans Football Team. 73 After two stellar seasons
as an All-American NCAA wide receiver catching thirty touchdowns and
accumulating 2,579 receiving yards, Williams desired to test the professional market,
presumably in the National Football League (“NFL”).74 However, the NFL already
had a rule prohibiting individuals who were not three years removed from high
school from entering the NFL Draft.75
Shortly before the start of Williams’ junior campaign with the Trojans, Maurice
Clarett, an excellent freshman running back whose on-field contributions brought
Ohio State the National Championship in 2002, filed suit against the NFL
challenging the “3 Year Rule.”76 At that time, Clarett was suspended by Ohio State
for the upcoming season due to his off-field conduct in violation of university
policy.77 Clarett, finding himself with no other outlet to cultivate his athletic talent,
desperately desired to turn pro.78 A lower court ruling “struck down the ‘3 Year
Rule,’ and suddenly the barn doors were flung open, ready for any freshman or
sophomore who [was] confident in his ability to compete at the next level.” 79
Viewing this ruling as an opportunity to exploit his own skills at the pro level, Mike
Williams, dropped out of USC and hired an agent.80 Williams also signed
endorsement deals, reaping gifts and benefits in excess of $100,000.00.81 Shortly

71.
Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 40, Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02CA2302 (Colo.
App. Sept. 16, 2003).
72.
See, e.g., Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 40, Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02CA2302
(Colo. App. Sept. 16, 2003).
73.
Bob Plain, Personal Foul: Mike Williams Gets Screwed by the NCAA Again, THE SIMON MAG.
ONLINE, http://www.thesimon.com/magazine/articles/article_of_the_week/0.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F.Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d in part, 306 F.Supp
3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
77.
Id. at 388; Plain, supra note 73.
78.
Plain, supra note 73; see Clarett, 306 F.Supp. at 388.
79.
Plain, supra note 73.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
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thereafter, on appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s
ruling finding in favor of the NFL, thus reinstating its coveted “3 Year Rule.” 82
As a result of the Second Circuit decision, Williams found himself in a precarious
predicament, unable to earn a living in the NFL and ineligible to return to college
football.83 He pleaded with the NCAA to reinstate his eligibility. 84 The NCAA halfheartedly entertained Williams’ plea for reinstatement, even designing a course of
rehabilitation for Williams’ to follow, only to strike down Williams’ attempt at
reinstatement just one day prior to the Trojans’ home opener.85 There is speculation
that the NCAA had no intention, whatsoever, of reinstating Williams, and his attempt
at reinstatement was merely a charade that the NCAA orchestrated simply to put
other student-athletes on notice that anyone who signs with an agent and receives
financial benefits will automatically lose his/her eligibility regardless of the
circumstances.86
Proponents of student-athlete compensation argue that Williams’ situation
demonstrates the NCAA’s long standing ability to circumvent anti-trust laws in order
to keep individuals from exploiting their own talents in the job market for pecuniary
gain.87 Proponents contend that if student-athletes receive greater compensation for
their efforts, then situations such as the one facing both Clarett and Williams may
never have come to fruition.88 Proponents further argue that the NCAA, in collusion
with the professional sports leagues that impose age limitations, provides a major
disservice to student-athletes and thus creates potential future situations analogous
to these case studies in which individuals are prevented from earning a living in the
marketplace.89 Therefore, it is imperative that the NCAA either address the issue of

82.

See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 3d 124, 139 – 140 (2d Cir. 2004); Plain, supra note

73.
83.

Plain, supra note 73.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Freedman, supra note 58, at 710 (2003). It can be argued, however, that student-athletes have begun to
exploit their talents in the job market for pecuniary gain before entering college. For example,
Adidas allegedly paid $100,000.00 to the family of a “heavily recruited high school standout,” steering him to
play for a certain university. Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Coaches, Adidas Executive Face Charges; Pitino’s Program
Implicated, N.Y. Times (Sep. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/sports/ncaa-adidas-bribery.
html?mcubz=0. This practice, as well as alleged kick-backs to NCAA coaches to influence their student athletes,
is a clear exploitation of the NCAA’s amateurism rules. Id. If student-athletes were compensated, such a “black
market for teenage athletes” would not exist. Id.
88.
Alex Moyer, Throwing out the Playbook: Replacing the NCAA’s Anticompetitive Amateurism Regime
with the Olympic Model, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 777 (2015); Paul Solman, Is the NCAA Failing Its College
Athletes?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/is-the-ncaa-failing-itscollege-athletes/ (describing a situation where a student-athlete was suspended for accepting a benefit).
89.
Moyer, supra note 88, at 777 (discussing the collusion between professional sports leagues and the
NCAA); Huma & Staurowsky, supra note 5, at 13; Pat Garofalo, NBA Age Limit is (March) Madness, U.S. NEWS
84.
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age restrictions with the professional sports leagues or loosen some of its more
restrictive eligibility requirements.90
The counter argument against student-athlete compensation is that since the
NCAA is a private non-profit organization, free to impose its own regulatory scheme,
those student-athletes that do not want to abide by the eligibility requirement should
seek alternative means of honing their craft. 91 Critics of student-athlete compensation
contend that while Bloom’s, Williams’, and Clarett’s situations were unfortunate,
these circumstances were an aberration and not the norm in college athletics. 92
2. Student-Athletes Leaving College Early to Pursue Professional Sports
Today, more so than ever, student-athletes are leaving college early to pursue
opportunities in professional sports.93 Financial gain is typically the main reason that
student-athletes leave college early.94 For example, in a 2004 survey analyzing the
graduation rates of each Division I men’s basketball team that participated in the
2004 NCAA Tournament, 42 of the 65 participating teams graduated less than half
of their players.95 Another study showed that “four of the [participating] colleges had

(Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/pat-garofalo/2015/03/27/nba-age-limit-is-marchmadness (advocating the abolishment of the age limit in the NBA).
90.
Huma & Staurowsky, supra note 5, at 14 (“The U.S. Department of Justice should aggressively and
whole-heartedly pursue antitrust suits against the NCAA to prevent further harm to college athletes, and Congress
should act immediately to deregulate the NCAA. NCAA reform should be funded with new TV revenue streams
that are surging throughout NCAA sport and include the following provisions.”).
91.
Glenn M. Wong, Warren Zola & Chris Deubert, Going Pro in Sports: Providing Guidance to StudentAthletes in a Complicated Legal & Regulatory Environment, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 553, 577 n. 120
(2011) (“There have been some highly publicized attempts to circumvent the rule.”). See Javier Morales, It’s
Time for Draft Eligibility Rules that Make Sense for the Player, NCAA, and NBA, COLLEGE AD (Apr. 20, 2016),
http://collegead.com/its-time-for-draft-eligibility-rules-that-make-sense-for-the-player-ncaa-and-nba/
(describing how Thon Maker skirted the NCAA’s eligibility rules by playing in Canada).
92.
Alan Milstein, The Maurice Clarett Story: A Justice System Failure, 20 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIV. L.
REV. 216, 227 (2015) (stating that Maurice Clarett’s situation was more dire than that of most college athletes);
see Jared Walch, Should Athletes be Paid to Play?, USA TODAY: COLLEGE (Oct. 20, 2016), http://college.
usatoday.com/2016/10/20/should-athletes-be-paid-to-play/ (arguing that football and basketball bring the most
revenue and it would be unfair to compensate them over other students).
93.
Blake Williams, The Numbers Behind the Record 107 College Players Leaving Early for the NFL,
FORBES (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/blakewilliams3012/2016/01/22/the-numbers-behind-therecord-107-college-players-leaving-early-for-the-nfl/#79c6fb640c0f (stating that a record 107 college football
players declared for the NFL Draft in 2016).
94.
Brooks & Davies, supra note 47, at 756 (describing the difficult financial situation of student-athletes,
of which many cannot afford even incidental expenses); see Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Young Athletes, a Degree
Matters, ESPN (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/8344785/young-athletes-degreematters; Walch, supra note 92 (stating that many players cite financial hardship as primary reason for declaring
early for the draft).
95.
Dave Sheingold, March Madness Player’s Graduating Less Than Their Peers, USA TODAY (Mar. 23,
2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/basketball/2017/03/23/march-madness-basketball-tourn
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graduation rates of zero, and 16 had rates of 25 percent or less.”96 This phenomena
has sparked debate as to whether college retention rates amongst student-athletes
might be higher if student-athletes were adequately compensated for their efforts and,
in turn, closer attention was paid by administrators to their academics. 97
Proponents of student-athlete compensation argue that it is in the best interest of
both the university and the student to find ways to rectify this problem. 98 From the
university’s perspective, it can be debilitating for an athletic program to lose its top
recruit after only one or two seasons.99 Consequently, the athletic program may find
itself in a rebuilding stage for several years.100 From the student-athlete’s perspective,
it is undeniably beneficial for a student to obtain a degree that can be utilized in the
job market.101
ament-players-graduating-less-graduation-rates/99509216/ (finding that players who participate in March
Madness graduate at a 15-25% lower rate than the student body, based upon NCAA data).
96.
NCAA graduation rates improve, ESPN (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/
_/id/11779124/ncaa-graduation-rates-improve-critics-cry-foul (“Those who question the NCAA’s [graduation
rate] stats contend the higher numbers are skewed because athletes have more access to tutors, learning specialists
and multimillion-dollar academic centers—all of which are intended to keep players academically eligible and
on track to graduate. They also believe athletes are sometimes being advised to take easier courses.”); see
Sheingold, supra note 95 (“[T]he typical school in this year’s NCAA men’s basketball tournament graduates 50
percent of its players within six years, compared to rate of 71.5 percent for student bodies as a whole.”).
97.
Walch, supra note 92 (“If college athletes were paid for the talents that they possess while in school,
they might be more willing to finish their degree.”); see also Matthew J. Gustin, The O’Bannon Court Got It
Wrong: The Case Against Paying NCAA Student-Athletes, 42 W. ST. L. REV. 137, 140 n.32 (2015).
98.
Brooks & Davies, supra note 94, at 755 (arguing that the NCAA has a responsibility to cover the entirety
of the education costs for student-athletes on scholarship); Gustin, supra note 97, at 140 n.32 (stating that keeping
talent in school through compensation could outweigh lost revenue from customers who disagree with a decision
to compensate).
99.
See Dylan Hernandez, College Basketball’s So-Called One-and-Done Rule Needs Revisiting, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/sports/la-sp-college-one-and-done-hernandez-20160324story.html (“The only beneficiary of the system is the NBA, which can use college competition instead of high
school to screen its potential employees.”); Myron Medcalf, Roots of One-And-Done Rule Run Deep, ESPN (June
26, 2012), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/ id/8097411/roots-nba-draft-one-done-rule-rundeep-men-college-basketball (discussing the instability and academic ramifications that are a product of the oneand-done rule in NCAA basketball). Contra NCAA, The True “One-and-Done” Problem in Division I Men’s
Basketball, NCAA, (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/true-one-and-done-problemdivision-i-men-s-basketball (arguing that the real destabilizing force in college basketball is the high athlete
transfer rate, not the one-and-done system) [hereinafter NCAA, One-and-Done]
100.
See Hernandez, supra note 99 (“The only beneficiary of the system is the NBA, which can use college
competition instead of high school to screen its potential employees.”); Medcalf, supra note 99 (discussing the
instability and academic ramifications that are a product of the one-and-done rule in NCAA basketball).
Contra NCAA, One-and-Done, supra note 99 (arguing that the real destabilizing force in college basketball is
the high athlete transfer rate, not the one-and-done system).
101.
Jennifer Cheeseman Day & Eric C. Newburger, The Big Payoff: Educational Attainment and Synthetic
Estimates of Work-Life Earnings, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, at 4 (2002), https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/
p23-210.pdf (stating that individuals with a bachelor’s degree earn on average $2.1 million more than those who
did not finish college); GALLUP-PURDUE INDEX REPORT: UNDERSTANDING LIFE OUTCOMES OF FORMER NCAA
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Also, the additional time spent in college is viewed as being highly beneficial to
the acceleration of a student-athlete’s maturation process since college students are
still growing both physically and emotionally.102 If there were greater incentive for
the student-athlete to remain at school, besides the obvious reward of attaining an
education, then school retention rates might be higher. 103 In addition, “legal” and
ethical student-athlete compensation might reduce the abuse and corruption that
occurs in college athletics on an underground level, thus diminishing the potential
for overreaching booster influence.104 While a college setting may afford a studentathlete a great opportunity for the student-athlete to hone his/her athletic skills and
receive an education at the same time, the NCAA sometimes fails to consider the
portion of student-athletes that desire to better not only themselves, but also their
families.105
Critics of compensation for student-athletes claim that by financially rewarding a
student-athlete simply for his/her athletic prowess, the college, in turn, is
consequently undermining the value of providing a highly discounted education. 106
Critics contend that financially rewarding student-athletes at the expense of funding

STUDENT-ATHLETES 3 (2016), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2016_Gallup_NCAA_Student_Athlete_
Report_20160503.pdf (“Former student-athletes who received a bachelor’s degree between 1970 and 2014 are
leading other college graduates in four out of five elements of well-being that Gallup studied.”).
102.
Hernandez, supra note 99, at 2 (reciting NBA Commissioner Adam Silver’s belief that more time in
college makes student-athletes better prepared to be professionals); GALLUP-PURDUE INDEX REPORT:
UNDERSTANDING LIFE OUTCOMES OF FORMER NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETES, supra note 101, at 3 (stating that
student athletes who earns degrees do better than non-athletes in life).
103.
Steve Murphy & Jonathan Pace, A Plan for Compensating Student-Athletes, BYU EDUC. & L.J. 167,
177–78 (1994) (“A possible positive effect of paying student-athletes could be that more athletes would stay in
school to finish their degree programs.”).
104.
Michael Rosenberg, A Simple Solution to NCAA Corruption: Let Stars get Paid, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(July 26, 2011), https://www.si.com/more-sports/2011/07/26/ncaa-pay (arguing in favor of athlete compensation
to reduce NCAA corruption); David M. Simon, End NCAA Cheating and Corruption: Just Pay Student Athletes,
WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/end-ncaa-cheating-and-corruptionjust-pay-student-athletes/article/2632529 (allowing payments to athletes will reduce corruption).
105.
Eckert, supra note 56, at 916–17 (arguing that the “courts should analyze under a stricter standard those
claims brought by athletes who allege a failure to value the athletes’ welfare over their athletic contributions”).
106.
Katherine Kargl, Note, Is Amateurism Really Necessary or is it an Illusion Supporting the NCAA’s
Anticompetitive Behaviors: The Need for Preserving Amateurism in College Athletics, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 379,
392–93 (2017) (“Education is the universities’ main purpose, and paying the athletes would severely undermine
this objective.”); Wong, supra note 33, at 1102 (arguing that compensation detracts from the value of a student
athletes education, thereby damaging the amateurism model); Ekow N. Yankah, Why NCAA Athletes Shouldn’t
be Paid, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/sporting-scene/why-ncaaathletes-shouldnt-be-paid (arguing that paying athletes reduces the value of the education being offered).
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cultural programs, such as the arts, stifles creativity and negates achievement in many
other facets of academia.107
F. Taxation Issues
Under the current federal tax structure, universities “enjoy certain tax benefits based
on the student-athletes’ amateur educational status.” 108 As a result, universities
receive favorable tax treatment on the revenue generated from college athletics.109
Since college athletics are designated by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to be
an integral part of the education requirements of a university, universities receive
favorable tax treatment compared to similarly situated businesses or corporations. 110
Because the IRS does not consider a university to be engaged in a commercial
venture for profit, this designation makes it increasingly difficult for proponents of
student-athlete compensation to circumvent tax and labor law in order to legally
compensate a student-athlete in accordance with both federal and NCAA
guidelines.111
G. Antitrust Law and Labor Issues
Antitrust laws, specifically the Sherman Act, are a critical ingredient for non-profit
organizations associated with the world of amateur sports.112 The main goals of
antitrust laws are to remove “anti-competitive collusion and to prevent monopolistic

107.
See, e.g., Roxanne Schroeder-Arce, Why do We Value Sports Over the Arts?, MY SAN ANTONIO:
EXPRESS-NEWS (Mar. 5, 2016, 8:11 AM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/Why-dowe-value-sports-over-the-arts-6872039.php.
108.
Haden, supra note 38, at 678 (“The pay-for-play advocates encounter additional obstacles in their
quest to compensate the student-athlete due to the various tax benefits universities enjoy based on the studentathletes’ amateur educational status.”); see also Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47 (“[T]he athletic scholarships
are awarded by the university primarily to aid the recipients in pursuing their studies, and therefore, the value of
the scholarships is excludable from the recipients’ gross incomes under section 117 of the Code.”).
109.
Haden, supra note 38, at 678.
110.
26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2017); See John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College
Athletics, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 109, 113 (2010) (“The NCAA and private universities, however, rely for their
exempt status on Section 501(c)(3), which provides exemption for charitable organizations, including religious
and educational organizations.”).
111.
26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2017); Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, the Student Athlete, and the
Professionalization of College Athletics, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 35, 54 (1987) (“Under existing law, colleges quite
simply have no clear protection from taxation of income attributable to professional sports.”).
112.
Wendy T. Kirby & T. Clark Weymouth, Antitrust and Amateur Sports: The Role of Noneconomic
Values, 61 IND. L.J. 31, 31 (1985) (“In recent years, courts have begun to address the question of how to apply
the antitrust laws to nonprofit organizations and other entities which, although they operate in the commercial
marketplace, assert ‘noneconomic’ justifications for their behavior. This question is becoming increasingly
important to the National Collegiate Athletic Association (‘NCAA’) and similar amateur sports organizations.”).
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and oligopolistic market structures.”113 Antitrust law is used to describe all laws that
intend to promote and regulate competition and make our competitive economic
system work.114 In the context of college athletics, the legal issues that arise concern
whether the laws should be applied to non-profit organizations such as the NCAA. 115
In essence, the NCAA’s designation as a non-profit organization has sheltered it from
antitrust violations despite the numerous profits derived by the universities as a
result.116 Recently, however, this has begun to shift as evident by the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Sports Athletic Association.117
In O’Bannon, the Court held that the NCAA’s compensation rules were subject
to antitrust scrutiny.118 The Court reasoned that even though the NCAA’s amateurism
rules helped create the “character and quality” of the NCAA’s product,119 the rules
can be invalidated under the Rule of Reason analysis. 120 This analysis requires that
the plaintiff prove: (1) the restraint on trade creates anticompetitive effects in a
specific market; (2) there is no procompetitive justification for the restraint; and (3)
the restraint is either not reasonably necessary to achieve its objectives or those
objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.121
Applying the Rule of Reason analysis, the Court first held that there was a college
education market in which the NCAA compensation rules created an anticompetitive
effect.122 The Court then held that the NCAA’s limits on student-athlete
compensation do not make college sports “more attractive.”123 Rather, it is the
NCAA’s commitment to amateurism and integration of academics and athletics that

113.

O. Yale Lewis, Jr., Amateur Athletes and the Law, HENDRICK & LEWIS (2005); see Mission, U.S. DEP’T

OF JUST.: ANTITRUST DIVISION, https://www.justice.gov/atr/mission (last visited Oct. 12, 2017) (“The goal of the

antitrust laws is to protect economic freedom and opportunity by promoting free and fair competition in the
marketplace.”).
114.
Daphne Alabama & Howard Bartee, Jr., The Role of Antitrust Laws in the Professional Sports Industry
from a Financial Perspective, 8 THE SPORT J., no. 2, at 2 http://www.thesportjournal. org/2005Journal/ Vol8No2/harry-bartee.asp (Oct. 4, 2004); see Guide to Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.
ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws (“These laws promote vigorous competition and
protect consumers from anticompetitive mergers and business practices.”).
115.
Kirby & Weymouth, supra note 112, at 32; Lewis, supra note 113.
116.
Lewis, supra note 113 (citing a number of cases illustrating how courts have used anti-trust laws to
shield the NCAA).
117.
802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
118.
Id.
119.
The product being amateur collegiate athletes participating in sporting events. Id. at 1063 (citing Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984)).
120.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 137 S.
Ct. 277 (2016).
121.
See id. at 1070 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of Southern Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)).
122.
Id.
123.
Id. at 1072.
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promote pro-competitive purposes.124 The Court then analyzed the plaintiff’s
proposals for substantially less restrictive alternatives to the NCAA’s compensation
rules.125 The first alternative was compensation up to the total cost of attendance. 126
The Court determined this was an acceptable alternative because it would not cause
consumers of college sports to become less interested.127 As for the second
alternative, allowing students to receive compensation for their right to publicity, the
Court found it was restrictive.128 Unlike the first alternative, this alternative directly
contradicted the NCAA’s interest in promoting amateurism because “not paying
student athletes is precisely what makes them amateurs.”129 From the Court’s
perspective, the difference between the two proposals was a “quantum leap.”130
Therefore, the Court upheld the lower court’s permanent injunction requiring the
NCAA to permit schools to provide compensation up to the cost of attendance, but
vacated the lower court’s permanent injunction requiring the NCAA to allow schools
to pay their athletes for their right to publicity. 131
In recent years, organized labor issues have come to the forefront of debate in the
context of student-athlete compensation.132 Currently, “NCAA student-athletes are
not represented by a players union.”133 Proponents of student-athlete compensation
contend that “while athletic department coaches and administrators are often paid
handsomely,” student-athletes should have the opportunity to organize in order “to
seek payment for their services” and potentially negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement with the NCAA.134 In 2015, the Northwestern University football players
filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) seeking a
determination that “the University’s football players who receive grant-in-aid
scholarships are employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act and direct an election in a unit of the grant-in-aid players.”135 The

124.

Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1074. The Ninth Circuit’s Rule of Reason Analysis test does not consider whether the restraint is
not reasonably necessary to achieve its objectives. Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir.
1996).
126.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 137 S.
Ct. 277 (2016).
127.
Id.
128.
Id. at 1076.
129.
Id.
130.
Id. at 1078.
131.
Id. at 1079.
132.
See Shane Loughlin, Note, Workers’ Compensation and Student-Athletes: Protecting the Unpaid Talent
in the Profit-Making Enterprise of Collegiate Athletics, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1737, 1739–41 (2016).
133.
EPSTEIN, supra note 45, at 233.
134.
Id.
135.
Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015).
125.
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NLRB unanimously decided to decline jurisdiction on the grounds that the “case
would not serve to promote stability in labor relations.”136
Workers’ compensation is another labor issue that arises in the context of studentathlete compensation.137 “Workers’ compensation laws are state statutes enacted to
compensate employees for job-related injuries or death, regardless of fault.” 138 The
argument made by proponents of Pay-for-Play clashes with the concepts of workers’
compensation because “in order to qualify for recovery under state workers’
compensation statutes, a person must meet the statute’s definition of an “employee”
as defined by the statute.”139 On one side of the argument, proponents of studentathlete compensation contend that the student-athletes are underpaid for their
services, however in the context of workers’ compensation this argument fails
because of the legalities involved in classifying a student-athlete as an employee of
the university.140 In addition, from an education policy stand point, the ramifications
for classifying student-athletes as employees could potentially blur and subsequently
erode the lines of demarcation distinguishing student-athletes from university
employees.141
NCAA rules and regulations, for instance, prohibit student-athletes from signing
with agents for the purpose of procuring outside employment. 142 The NCAA
contends that student-athletes no longer claim the rights and benefits accorded by
their amateur status upon receipt of financial benefits or outside employment for
monetary gain.143 Within its NCAA Division I manual, the NCAA represents that its
fundamental motivation is to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of
the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and,
by doing so, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports.”144

136.

Id.
Sean Alan Roberts, College Athletes, Universities, and Workers’ Compensation: Placing the
Relationship in the Proper Contact by Recognizing Scholarship Athletes as Employees, 37 S. TEX L. REV 1315,
1327–28 (1996).
138.
Haden, supra note 38, at 676.
139.
Id.
140.
Id. at 674, 676.
141.
Harold B. Hilborn, Comment, Student-Athletes and Judicial Inconsistency: Establishing a Duty to
Educate as a Means of Fostering Meaningful Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics, 89 NW. U.L. REV. 741, 777
(1995).
142.
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, SUMMARY OF NCAA ELIGIBILITY REGULATIONS  NCAA
DIVISION
I
3
(2017),
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017DICOMP_SummaryofNCAARegulations_20170613.pdf.
143.
Id.
144.
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETE ASS’N, 2017-2018 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1 (2017); see EPSTEIN,
supra note 45, at 19.
137.
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In Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, a Notre Dame football
player brought suit against the NCAA “after losing his college eligibility by
submitting himself for the NFL Draft and signing with an athlete agent.” 145 In Banks,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that “Banks had failed to define an anticompetitive effect of the alleged restraints on the markets.” 146 The Seventh Circuit
further concluded that “these (NCAA) rules were valid rules furthering the goal of
amateurism, and that the rules were very similar to grade and enrollment
requirements.”147
Furthermore, it seems horribly unjust that a student-athlete is prevented from
competing in the market place for his/her services, yet the universities and colleges
are able to retain all profits from that player’s on-field performance.148 However,
critics of student-athlete compensation argue that the NCAA must maintain a bright
line rule between amateurism and professionalism; otherwise the NCAA would be
opening the door for abuse and corruption of the college education system. 149
H. Title IX Implications
It is undeniable that Title IX, since its inception, has had a profound impact upon
college athletics.150 In the context of student-athlete compensation, Title IX remains
a highly controversial and widely debated issue.151 In theory, the main goal of Title
IX is to provide equal opportunity and funding to both men and women’s collegiate
programs.152 In Sports Law, author Adam Epstein contends that: “[p]roponents of the
law argue that Title IX continues to benefit women socially, economically, and even
emotionally.”153
In reality, however, “revenue [generating] sports such as football and men’s
basketball serve as the cash cow for women’s sports nationwide.”154 Often times, the
money generated from men’s programs is re-allocated to benefit a university’s entire

145.

Lewis, supra note 113 (citing Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1083–84 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id.
147.
Id.
148.
Keilman & Hopkins, supra note 11.
149.
See Kargl, supra note 106, at 393.
150.
Ellen J. Staurowsky, Title IX and College Sports: The Long Painful Path to Compliance and Reform,
14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 95, 98–99 (2003).
151.
Michael Rosen, Note, Constitutional Implications of Title IX Compliance in Colleges and Universities,
18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 503, 509 (2012).
152.
Allison Williams, Comment, Title IX- Tipping the Scales of Equality, 2005 DENV. U. SPORTS & ENT. L.
J. 1, 2 (2005).
153.
EPSTEIN, supra note 45, at 105.
154.
Id. at 114.
146.
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athletic department.155 As a result, conflicts arise when a student-athlete loses his or
her scholarship or receives less financial support as a direct result of a Title IX
measure.156
Proponents of student-athlete compensation argue that under certain
circumstances student-athletes should be compensated in order to offset financial
hardships directly related to Title IX mandated budgetary cuts to programs. 157 Often
times these financial hardships result in a reduction in scholarships for some men’s
teams and the elimination of some teams altogether.158 Consequently, many of these
student-athletes find themselves with few financial outlets to fund general college
expenses.159 With respect to critics of Title IX, Epstein suggests that “[m]uch of the
criticism of [Title IX] involves the interpretation of how it is applied.”160 While
critics of Title IX may contend that Title IX unfairly penalizes men’s sports programs
to a certain degree, the “courts have not held this argument to be a valid one under a
Title IX analysis.”161 Therefore, in order to remedy this apparent funding problem,
the NCAA, in accordance with Congress, should reassess the applicability of Title
IX and its impact on college athletics in the context of student-athlete compensation.

155.
See id. (generalizing that if men’s programs are funding women’s programs while at the same time
cutting other non-revenue men’s programs, then the revenue generating men’s programs are funding the entire
athletic department).
156.
See Andrew J. Boyd, Comment, Righting the Canoe: Title IX and the Decline of Men’s Intercollegiate
Athletics, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 257, 258–62 (explaining that Title IX is a contributing factor to men losing
opportunities to play sports and men losing scholarship opportunities at institutions. These results have been
actively challenged in the courts).
157.
See Ross E. Simpson, Note, The Previous Pay is Under Further Review: Payment Problems Arising
from O’Bannon v. NCAA, 68 ARK. L. REV. 1117, 1130 (2016) (arguing that one interpretation of the O’Bannon
decision is that there would not be Title IX violations if cost-of-attendance stipends were delivered exclusively
to male student-athletes because unequal compensation of male and female athletes is permissible if the male
student-athletes are using a higher degree of skill, responsibility, and effort than their female counterparts).
158.
See Kerensa E. Barr, Comment, How the Boys of Fall are Failing Title IX, 82 UMKC L. REV. 181, 200
(2013) (revisiting the history of NCAA football scholarships and determining that there was originally no limit
on the amount of scholarships awarded but which progressively reduced to 105 in 1973, 95 in 1975, and finally
to the current level of 85 in 1994-1995); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 45, at 105 (establishing that “numerous
male swimming, wrestling, football, water polo, baseball, and other programs have been eliminated in the name
of Title IX compliance.”).
159.
See Christopher Davis, Jr. & Dylan Oliver Malagrinò, The Myth of the Full Ride: Cheating our
Collegiate Athletes and the Need for Additional NCAA Scholarship-Limit Reform, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 605, 612
(2013) (explaining that if “[t]he difference between the estimated cost of attendance and the full grant-in-aid is
approximately $3000 annually, depending on the institution” those who lose some or all of their scholarship will
incur more debt to fund general college expenses).
160.
EPSTEIN, supra note 45, at 105.
161.
See id. at 115 (determining that case law is unfriendly to the claim that Title IX unfairly penalizes men’s
sports programs).
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I. Financial Destitute and Post-Graduation Debt
Many scholarship student-athletes find that the financial package that they received
in the form of an athletic scholarship is insufficient to meet the financial demands of
attending college for four years.162 This financial insecurity stems from expensive
living costs, i.e. rent, books, and food, which are usually not covered by athletic
scholarship.163 In addition to the rigid time constraints imposed by team commitment
requirements, NCAA regulations hamper a student-athlete’s ability to be gainfully
employed full-time during the academic year.164
For instance, while the NCAA promulgated a rule that permits a student-athlete
to be employed during the academic year, the NCAA prohibits compensation for any
publicity, reputation, fame, or personal following that a student-athlete may provide
to his or her employer.165 Considering the tremendous living expenses associated
with attending college and the limited amount of time student athletes have to work,
it becomes very difficult for student-athletes to stay afloat financially. 166 All of these
factors contribute to a system in which some student-athletes find themselves
“financially destitute” post-graduation.167 For example, a 2005 survey of 5,600
NCAA student-athletes found that “the average student-athlete plans to graduate with
approximately $14,200 in student loans and credit card debt.”168 This survey also
revealed that student-athletes envision themselves earning at least a starting salary of

162.
See Davis, Jr. & Malagrinò, supra note 159, at 612 (establishing that “[t]he difference between the
estimated cost of attendance and the full grant-in-aid is approximately $3,000 annually, depending on the
institution”).
163.
See id. at 617, 620 (citing out of pocket expenses such as cell phone bills, laundry, toiletries, food,
entertainment, and transportation costs as reasons why student-athletes cannot meet the financial demands
associated with college).
164.
Michael P. Acain, Comment, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploitation of College Athletes,
18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307, 315 (1998) (in 1996, the NCAA passed a rule allowing student-athletes to have parttime jobs to make up the difference between what a scholarship is worth and the actual cost of attendance).
165.
Jon Solomon, 10 Ways College Athletes Can Get Paid and Remain Eligible for Their Sport, CBS
SPORTS (June 21, 2016), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/10-ways-college-athletes-can-getpaid-and-remain-eligible-for-their-sport/.
166.
See Caitlin D. Buckstaff, Comment, Covering the Spread: An Assessment of Amateurism and
Vulnerability of Student-Athletes in an Emerging Culture of Sports Wagering, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 133,
157 (2013) (explaining that “many college players live below the federal poverty line . . . [because] most athletic
scholarships failed to cover the essentials like food and clothing.”).
167.
See John A. Maghamez, Comment, An All-Encompassing Primer on Student-Athlete Name, Image, and
Likeness Rights and How O’Bannon v. NCAA and Keller v. NCAA Forever Changed College Athletics, 9 LIBERTY
U. L. REV. 313, 317 (2015) (explaining that even student-athletes with the maximum scholarships can end up in
debt between $12,888 and $30,000 because these scholarships only cover room and board, tuition, and books).
168.
NCAA News Release, College Athletes Optimistic About Financial Future, But Survey Shows
Unrealistic Expectations, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION (Oct. 24, 2005), http://fs.ncaa.org/
Docs/PressArchive/2005/Corporate%2BNews/College%2BAthletes%2BOptimistic%2BAbout%2BFinancial%
2BFuture%2BBut%2BSurvey%2BShows%2BUnrealistic%2BExpectations.html.
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approximately “$64,500,” when in actuality, the average starting salary for a college
graduate is “$32,000.”169 The reality is that both student-athletes and college
administrators are not in tune with the financial hardships that await student-athletes
after graduation.170 It is imperative that the NCAA promulgate rules loosening
earning restriction requirements, otherwise the NCAA will be perpetuating a culture
of student-athletes unprepared for the financial struggles that occur both during and
after graduation.
J. Efforts at Reform
Efforts to protect student-athletes and their earning capacity are underway in certain
jurisdictions throughout the United States.171 In California, for example, the state
legislature adopted a “Bill of Rights” for college athletes. 172 The California Bill of
Rights was designed to protect student-athletes from exploitation.173 Earlier versions
of the bill eliminated rules for the terms or duration of scholarships below the cost of
tuition, gave an athlete the ability to transfer when his or her coach leaves the school,
and reduced the earning capacity restrictions with respect to off-campus jobs held
while school is in session.174 Ultimately, these provisions did not make the final
version of the bill passed by the California state legislature.175 The California Bill of
Rights only protects incapacitated or injured student athletes, and requires athletic

169.
See Harold L. Sirkin, Reality Check on Starting Pay, FORBES (May 11, 2017, 2:06 PM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/haroldsirkin/2017/05/11/reality-check-on-starting-pay/#6bf272257c9a (explaining that 52% of
college graduates expect to make at least $50,000 or more per year); see also Kelsey Gee, Outlook is Rosier for
Class of ‘17, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2017) (stating that the base pay for college grads is $49,785).
170.
See Doug Webber, To Ease the Student Debt Crisis, Hold Universities Accountable, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT,
(April 6, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/to-ease-the-student-debt-crisis-hold-collegesresponsible/ (arguing that while the public focus has been on the role of students borrowing money and the role
of government encouraging such lending, we also need to focus on the universities role in the student debt issue).
171.
Legislation was introduced during both the 113th and 114th sittings of Congress that attempted to help
protect student athletes, but both measures failed to garner enough support. See generally Collegiate Student
Athlete Protection Act, H.R. 3545 113th Cong. (2013); National Collegiate Athletic Association Act, H.R. 2731,
114th Cong. (2015). In 2017, Connecticut Representatives Patricia Dillion, Matthew Lesser, and Josh Elliot
introduced a bill aimed at protecting the health and safety of college athletes. See generally H.B. 6870, 2017
Conn. Gen. Assemb. Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2017).
172.
See generally CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 67450–53 (2013).
173.
See Matthew R. Cali, Comment, The NCAA’s Transfer of Power: An Analysis of the Future Implications
the Proposed NCAA Transfer Rules Will Have on the Landscape of College Sports, 21 JEFFERY S. MOORAD
SPORTS L.J. 217, 242–43 (2014) (explaining that states such as California are taking steps to recognize, provide,
and protect the rights of student athletes).
174.
S.B. 1525, 2011-2012 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (as amended by S. Comm. On Rules, Mar. 27, 2012).
175.
Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 67450–53 (2013), with S.B. 1525, 2011-2012 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012)
(as amended by S. Comm. On Rules, Mar. 27, 2012).
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programs to conduct financial and life skills workshops for first-year and third-year
student athletes.176
In another effort at reform, commencing in 2004, the Division I Academic Cabinet
Agents and Amateurism Subcommittee agreed to support a “legislative concept that
would prohibit institutions, conferences and the NCAA from using a studentathlete’s name or likeness for retail sales while the student-athlete still has eligibility
remaining.”177 The Subcommittee met with CEOs in the licensing and manufacturing
industries, University Athletic Directors and student-athlete representatives with the
intent of tightening the NCAA’s licensing rules.178 While former NCAA President
Myles Brand offered encouraging words at this subcommittee stating: “[o]ur
[NCAA] bottom line is educating students, whereas the bottom line for pros is
making profits,” the reality is that the NCAA serves as an intermediary, brokering
“For-Profit” deals between universities and the licensing and manufacturing
industries.179 Brand further clarified: “We need to draw a much brighter line between
promotions and revenue gain. It’s a cutting-edge distinction between college and pro
sports and it’s important that we get it right.” 180 Ultimately, only time will tell
whether these efforts at reform come to fruition when the bottom line is at stake in
the overall equation.
III. EXAMINING A COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY’S FIDUCIARY DUTY TO ITS
STUDENT-ATHLETES

A. Current Four-Year Scholarship Athletes
Upon signing a letter of intent to attend a particular institution, many college-athletes
are promised, by their universities or colleges, compensation in the form of a fouryear athletic scholarship.181 In turn, student-athletes are advised by the university of
his/her obligations to remain eligible for these scholarships. 182 Some of these
requirements include: minimum grade point average, qualifying for a roster position,

176.

See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 67452–53 (2013).
Gary T. Brown, Cabinet Subcommittee launches review of Licensing Issues, NCAA NEWS (June 21,
2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20050214210000/http://www.ncaa.org/news/2004/20040621/active/4113
n02.html.
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
Patrick Hruby, Why Top NCAA Recruits Shouldn’t Sign National Letters of Intent, VIBE SPORTS (Feb.
1, 2017), https://sports.vice.com/en_ca/article/pgn38z/why-top-ncaa-recruits-shouldnt-sign-national-letters-ofintent (“Enter the NLI. By signing the letter, an athlete agrees to attend a particular school; in return, the school
agrees to give that player an athletic scholarship. In theory, this is all well and good.”).
182.
Maintaining Your Eligibility, How to Keep Your Scholarship, ATHLETES USA, http://athletesusa.com/blog/maintaining-eligibility-keep-scholarship/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
177.
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and high performance on the athletic field. 183 Failure to meet some of these
requirements, in some instances, results in the loss of a scholarship. 184
In recent years, student-athletes have attempted to exercise their legal rights to an
education through the court system.185 Many of these lawsuits have come in the form
of contractual claims.186 In the landmark case, Ross v. Creighton University, a
talented basketball player sued the “school for failing to give him a meaningful
education.”187 In Ross, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ross needed
to show a specific promise and failure to deliver on that promise.” 188 The Seventh
Circuit elucidated in its decision that this was an “‘educational malpractice claim’ (a
claim not heard by the courts) re-packaged as a contract claim” and therefore ruled
against the student-athlete on those narrow grounds. 189
In Jackson v. Drake University, a slightly different case concerning a contractual
right to academics and sports, the student-athlete claimed that the school “interfered
with his academics as well as his participation in basketball because he was subjected
to verbal abuse.”190 The student believed that the verbal abuse was allegedly the
catalyst for the student’s voluntary departure from the university. 191 In Jackson, the
Iowa State court granted summary judgment to the university on the grounds, again,
that it did not permit educational malpractice claims.192 Both of these cases
demonstrate the judicial system’s unwillingness to hold universities liable for
“educational malpractice claims,” due in part, to the precedent it would set and the
potential flood of litigation claims that might arise when a student-athlete believed
that his/her right to an education was infringed upon.193
B. Former Scholarship Student-Athletes
Former scholarship student-athletes, who for one reason or another, may have lost
their scholarship often face financial hardships to pay for college, and consequently

183.

Id.
Id.
185.
See Lewis, supra note 113.
186.
See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992); Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp.
1490 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
187.
See Lewis, supra note 113 (citing Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992)).
188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id. (citing Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1492 (S.D. Iowa 1991)).
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992); Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp.
1490, 1492 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
184.

60

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW

KOBLENZ_Whole_Nine_Yards (Do Not Delete)

1/2/2018 3:29 PM

ADAM H. KOBLENZ
tend to either fail or drop out.194 It is important to analyze what, if any, fiduciary duty
a university may have to these former scholarship athletes. On first glance, it does
not seem equitable that a former scholarship athlete could be deserted by an academic
institution simply due to sub-par athletic performance.
This notion of university abandonment does not speak glowingly of higher
education.195 When one considers, for example, a hypothetical situation where a
university offers a student a scholarship in the arts, it would be unheard of for the
university to terminate a student’s financial support simply because he/she either was
not performing on Broadway or his/her artwork was not on display at a notable art
gallery. In other words, therein lies a double standard in college education when a
student-athlete’s athletic achievement is solely connected to his/her financial
support.196 Whereas in other facets of academia, scholarship students do not face
such intense scrutiny, and are less likely to be subjected to such rigid scholarship
eligibility requirements as under the current system. 197
IV. CONCLUSION

College athletics serve as a critical staple of American culture, more so today than
ever before.198 As the number of individuals attending college has increased, so has
the interest in college athletics.199 While college athletics provide physically gifted
students with an opportunity to hone their athletic skills, promote discipline, and
build character, the reality is that there is also a flourishing business side to it that
seeks to exploit the purest form of amateurism.200
The reality is that college athletics generate millions of dollars in revenue for
universities across the country, helping to fund college programs, pay professors and

194.
See Jamilah King, How Scholarships Leave Student-Athletes Powerless in the NCAA Game,
COLORLINES, (Mar. 23, 2012), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/how-scholarships-leave-student-athletespowerless-ncaa-game.
195.
See id. (recounting the experience of a former Penn State Basketball player whose scholarship was taken
away because of her sexual orientation).
196.
See id.
197.
See Deborah Ziff, 4 Myths About Athletic Scholarships, U.S. NEWS, https://www.usnews.com/
education/best-colleges/paying-for-college/articles/2017-10-04/4-myths-about-athletic-scholarships (last visited
Oct. 21, 2017) (explaining the rigorous criteria in obtaining an athletic scholarship); see also Scholarships,
DAUGHTERS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, https://www.dar.org/national-society/scholarships/specificscholarships-0 (last visited Sept. 24, 2017) (explaining the criteria for performing arts scholarships).
198.
See King, supra note 195 (stating that college athletics receive non-stop media coverage during March
Madness).
199.
Id.
200.
See id. (quoting a recent study, which stated that “National College Player’s Association found that in
2009-10, the poorest basketball and football players generated combined revenues in each sport of more than $30
million but lived $3,000 to $5,000 below the poverty line”).
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erect campus buildings.201 The student-athletes’ status under the current framework,
however, remains one of controversial debate.202 College athletes are still exploited
for their athletic prowess, often at the expense of a quality education. 203 Therefore, it
is critical that this issue be addressed in a constructive and equitable manner that
strikes a delicate balance between the preservation of higher education and the
uncompromising protection of the legal rights of the student-athlete.

201.
Maurice Peebles, 7 Common Sense Reasons Why College Athletes Should Be Paid (According to Jay
Bilas), COMPLEX SPORTS, (Dec. 3, 2017) http://www.complex.com/sports/2015/12/jay-bilas-interview/.
202.
See id. (addressing why college athletes deserve to be paid).
203.
King, supra note 195.
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